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Abstract: The adjudication of regional and international economic disputes has
become the final frontier in the migration of constitutional ideas. The migration
of these ideas across different branches of law has become increasingly common, building bridges between different legal systems, furthering judicial dialogue, and allowing judicial borrowing. Scholars, adjudicators and practitioners “establish a transnational legal discourse and act as merchants of law.”
Against this background, this study investigates the migration of constitutional
ideas to regional and international economic law by focusing on the migration
of the concept of proportionality from constitutional law to European Union
(EU) law and international investment law. The article shows that while the
concept of proportionality has analytical merits, it also presents a number of pitfalls when applied to the context of economic disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly, philosophers are in the right when they tell us that
nothing is great or little otherwise than by comparison.
— Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels

The adjudication of regional and international economic disputes has
become the last frontier of the migration of constitutional ideas. The migration of constitutional ideas across different branches of law has come to be
a common practice, building bridges between different legal systems, furthering judicial dialogue and allowing judicial borrowing. Scholars, adjudicators and practitioners “establish a transnational legal discourse and act as
merchants of law.”1 According to this paradigm, constitutional ideas are
“goods” or “merchandise” imported from the outside into a different legal
order.2 Can constitutional benchmarks help adjudicators in interpreting and
applying broad and open-ended treaty provisions? Can these constitutional
ideas help facilitate the consideration of the commonweal in international
and regional adjudication, contribute to the humanization of international
and regional economic law, or both? Can the use of constitutional analogies
contribute to the current debate over the legitimacy of international and regional economic integration? Are there rules to govern this “market”?
Should such rules exist? What are the limits, if any, of constitutional approaches to international and regional economic integration?
Although the use of constitutional ideas in international and regional
economic law can offer concrete solutions to emerging conceptual dilemmas, and is forcefully presented by reputed scholars, one may question
whether a more critical approach to the use of such concepts should be
adopted. It is often assumed that borrowing is a neutral process, but this is
not always the case. Further reflection on the methodology of constitutional
analogies in international and regional economic integration is needed.
Against this background, this study investigates the migration of constitutional ideas to regional and international economic law by focusing on
a case study that is the migration of the concept of proportionality from
constitutional law to European Union (EU) law and international investment law. The article shows that while the concept of proportionality has
analytical merits, it also presents a number of pitfalls when applied to the
context of economic disputes. While proportionality is a general principle
of EU law,3 no consensus seems to have arisen with regard to its legal status
in international law. If proportionality was a general principle of law, or
1

Sabino Cassese, Beyond Legal Comparison, 2012 ANNUARIO DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E DI STUDI
387, 388 (2012).
2
Id.
3
See generally THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evelyn Ellis ed.,
1999).
LEGISLATIVI
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was deemed to reflect state practice (and thus constitute an element of customary law) it could be eventually used in international investment law and
arbitration as part of the applicable law or as a matter of treaty interpretation. Considering proportionality in investment treaty arbitration can be
problematic due to this uncertainty. To be sure, if the applicable law is that
of the host state and if such law includes the proportionality principle, then
proportionality becomes relevant in the context of investment treaty arbitration. Beyond this specific case, however, this article focuses on proportionality as seen through the lens of constitutional ideas and concludes that
more comparative and international law studies are needed to ascertain the
legal status of proportionality in international law.
The article proceeds as follows. First, after a brief introduction, the notion of the migration of constitutional ideas is defined and examined and its
promises and pitfalls are investigated. Second, the study highlights some
pitfalls of the proportionality analysis. Third, it focuses on the specific migration of the notion of proportionality from its constitutional matrix to the
regional sphere, focusing on EU law as a case study of successful legal migration. Fourth, it examines the use of the proportionality analysis in investment treaty arbitration. Fifth, a critical assessment is provided—
focusing on some critical methodological questions concerning the migration of constitutional ideas and the identification of general principles of
law. The conclusions will then sum up the key arguments of the study.
I. THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS
The migration of constitutional ideas is an interpretative and legislative act of borrowing elements belonging to given constitutional traditions
and importing them into a different legal system.4 Constitutional law indicates a body of national law setting up fundamental norms and mechanisms
of power control for the protection of the rights of the citizenry.5 The basic
idea is that the constitution constitutes “a higher or supreme law.”6 The gist
of constitutional law is to subject the exercise of governmental powers to
the limitations of a higher law.7
The migration of constitutional ideas is related to but differs from
constitutionalism in that the former implies a distance and or invisible
boundary between the source (i.e. the constitution) and the destination (in
casu EU law and international investment law). Rather, constitutionalism is
4

On the “migration of constitutional ideas,” see generally THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
IDEAS (Sujit Choudry ed., 2006).
5
SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT ATHENS TO
TODAY 4 (1999).
6
Günter Frankenberg, Comparative Constitutional Law, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 171 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012).
7
GORDON, supra note 5.
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a conceptual movement or doctrinal project—some contend a phenomenon—which proposes the constitutionalization of a number of different areas of law.8 Constitutionalization indicates:
The attempt to subject all governmental action within a designated
field to the structures, processes, principles and values of a ‘constitution’ . . . [s]ince governmental power is now being channelled
through regional, supranational and international agencies, constitutionalization . . . [aims at] subjecting the exercise of all types of public power . . . to the discipline of constitutional procedures and
norms.9

The constitutionalization of different areas of law, ranging from public
international law,10 to international investment law11 and EU law12—
scholars argue—promote their humanization, suggest the idea of a scale of
higher values, and thus potentially contribute to the legitimacy of the system.13 Yet, constitutionalism risks blurring the distinction between international and constitutional law, thus interpreting the former through the lens
of the latter, while it is a traditional tenet of international law that states
must comply with international law even if this was in conflict with national law, including constitutional law. Whether or not the constitutionalization
of these areas of law has taken place is subject to debate.14 For the limited
purpose of this study, suffice it to say that constitutional law principles
can—and has—influence(d) other areas of the law. This has taken place into two different ways. First, the migration of constitutional ideas can take
the form of a legal transplant when the lawmakers deliberately borrow given legal tools from other legal systems. Second, the migration of constitutional ideas can take place at the judicial level through cross-judging.

8

NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRAS SAJÓ & SUSANNE BAER, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2010).
9
Martin Loughlin, What is Constitutionalization?, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. & POL. 1 (2009).
10
See generally JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (examining the questions as to whether and if so to what extent the international legal system has constitutional features comparable to what we find in national law);
TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS (Nicholas Tsagourias ed., 2007).
11
Peter Behrens, Towards the Constitutionalization of International Investment Protection, 45
ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS [ARCHIVE PUB. INT’L L.] 153–179 (2007).
12
See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION (T. Christiansen & C. Reh eds., 2009).
13
Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2004).
14
Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy Through ‘Higher Law’? Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION:
EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO 307 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003).
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A. The Migration of Constitutional Ideas through Legal Transplants
The migration of constitutional ideas can take the form of a legal
transplant from a legal system to another. The concept of legal transplant
has been introduced by Alan Watson who contended that there is no inherent relationship between law and society.15 According to Watson, being autonomous from any social structure, law develops by transplanting.16 A legal concept can be moved from a context and applied elsewhere.17
Inevitably, the concept will adapt to the new context; however, according to
Watson, the adaptation does not imply the failure of the transplant; rather it
is a natural process.18
In the constitutional realm, legal transplants have not been uncommon—constitutional ideas have migrated from one constitutional system to
another since ancient times.19 At the regional and international levels, the
migration of constitutional ideas plays a central role in treaty-making.20 For
instance, at the regional level, the treaty drafters structuring the relationship
between the courts of the European Union and those of the Member States
opted for a structure that echoes national systems delineating the interplay
between their ordinary and constitutional courts.21 Constitutional law has
played a pivotal role in the making of international (investment) law. For
instance, the provisions against indirect expropriation in a number of international investment treaties derive from United States (U.S.) Constitutional
law, specifically, the Penn Central test, articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court.22 In parallel, as the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (US
Model BIT)23 is often used as a template by a number of countries in their
investment for treaty negotiations, the lex Americana has become the gold
15

A. Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 314–5 (1978).
Id.
17
Id.
18
A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 19–20 (2d ed. 1993).
19
Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve, Intent on Making Mischief: Seven Ways of Using Comparative Law, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 25 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012) (stating that
Plato’s famous conception of the Republic “built on all the known constitutions of the time” and even
Aristotle had a project of collecting texts on all constitutions).
20
George A Bermann, Comparative Law and International Organizations, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 241, 249 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012) (stating that
treaty-making is one scenario “to which comparative law has the most obvious contribution to make
. . .”).
21
Id. at 251.
22
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). For commentary,
see A.B. Sanders, Of All Things Made in America Why Are We Exporting the Penn Central Test?, 30
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 339 (2010).
23
The 2012 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty includes both substantive and procedural standards of investment protection. The United States uses this model when it negotiates a given
BIT with another country. The text of the US Model BIT is available at the website of the U.S. Department of State.
16
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standard in the area.24
This process has not been uncontroversial or uncontested. Some commentators have argued that the extensive protection granted to investors’
rights amounts to an extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution,25 or an expression of the “Americanization” of international law.26 The interplay between constitutional law and international
investment law in the form of legal transplant has been investigated by a
number of authors;27 therefore this study focuses on the underexplored second dimension of this interplay—namely cross-judging.
B. The Migration of Constitutional Ideas through Cross-Judging
At the adjudicative level, constitutional ideas have migrated across
boundaries,28 contributing to the phenomenon of “judicial globalization”29
and the cross-pollination of different legal cultures. International and regional courts and tribunals as well as constitutional courts around the world
have increasingly “cross-judged”—cited and or relied upon each other’s
opinions—determining a judicial dialogue at both horizontal and vertical
levels.
At the horizontal level, the migration of constitutional ideas from one
international tribunal to another allows these tribunals to de-fragment the
alleged fragmentation of international law. The proliferation of different
treaty regimes and international courts has raised the question as to whether
international law is a fragmented system. There is no binding precedent in
international law. As international courts and tribunals are not structured in
a hierarchical fashion, they are not formally bound by the decisions of other
peers. By “importing” concepts from other international courts and tribunals, international adjudicators counteract the risk of fragmentation and reinforce the perceived unity of international law. In parallel, a number of na24

José E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 12–13 (I.A. Laird & Todd Weiler eds., 2010).
25
See, e.g., David Schneiderman, NAFTA’s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to
Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996).
26
On the Americanization of international law, see generally Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial
Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003).
27
See generally SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION–
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION (2009); GUS VAN
HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); Vicki Bean & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protection and the Misguided Quest for an
International Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003); G. Starner, Taking a Constitutional Look: NAFTA Chapter 11 as an Extension of Member States’ Constitutional Protection of Property, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 405 (2002); M. R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851 (2003).
28
Sujit Choudry, Migration as the New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1–25 (Sujit Choudry ed., 2006).
29
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1103–24 (2000).
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tional courts do consider foreign viewpoints in addressing analogous issues.30
In a vertical or hierarchical sense, national courts and tribunals in
common law jurisdictions follow the rule of “stare decisis.” Analogously, in
civil law jurisdictions, courts do regard the previous decisions of superior
courts, although they are not formally bound by the latter. At the vertical
level, the migration of constitutional ideas from constitutional law to the regional and international sphere—through the coalescence of general principles of law or customary international law—allows a dialogue between national constitutional courts on the one hand and supranational courts and
tribunals on the other. Such dialogue has also given rise to a common lexicon31 that fosters the circular migration of constitutional ideas from constitutional courts to regional and international fora and then back to constitutional courts.32 The migration of constitutional ideas to supranational law is
not unbound; the duty to bring national law into conformity with regional
and international law is a well settled part of customary law33 and this is
confirmed by consistent jurisprudence.34 Reliance on national constitutional
provisions does not justify a violation of supranational law.
The migration of constitutional ideas reflects the current “zeitgeist” or
spirit of the time due to the coexistence of different legal systems that are,
at times, overlapping, diverging, or both—legal pluralism.35 Law—once the
exclusive domain of states—has become a polycentric phenomenon, now
the terrain of competition among multiple regulatory entities at national, regional, and international levels. The adoption of communal judicial approaches is mainly motivated by functional reasons, especially when adjudicators face difficult cases, since resorting to other cases may provide them
with useful examples and strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the outcome.36 Looking outside one’s own system as a tool for reassessing and adjusting it to evolving circumstances can be a necessity.37 Whether this is
done for imitation or because of convergence in a given policy domain, the
30

Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2570 (2004).
See, e.g., David Feldman, Modalities of Internationalisation in Constitutional Law, 18 EUR. REV.
PUB. L. 131 (2006).
32
Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law
by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241 (2008).
33
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (7th ed. 2008).
34
See, e.g., Treatment of Polish National and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at 24–25 (Feb. 4). On the supremacy of
EU law, see Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
35
See, e.g., Günther Teubner, Global Bukovina: Legal Pluralism in the World-Society, in GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Günther Teubner ed., 1997); Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking Constitutional
Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 415 (2008).
36
Erlend M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 95, 116 (2012).
37
Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007).
31
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influence of borrowing goes beyond the specific case, influencing the culture of the importing system38 and determining gravitation towards certain
models which exert dominant influence. Reverse constitutional borrowing—absorbing the experience of other systems after their borrowing of
constitutional concepts—is theoretically possible, albeit rare.39 For instance,
in EU law reverse borrowing is taking place increasingly due to the influential role played by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).40
C. Methodological Aspects
As the migration of constitutional ideas is in essence a comparative
law endeavor, methodological concerns are myriad.41 Comparative law faces deep methodological challenges,42 concerning, inter alia, “the proper
terms, categories, scales, methods, and data to be used in comparison.”43
More specifically, with regard to the migration of constitutional ideas, the
key question is whether constitutional theory can be generalized and transposed from the national terrain to the supranational sphere.44 If international
adjudicators rely on domestic cases, there is a risk that they “cherry-pick”
the cases they are more familiar with, namely those of their legal system.
This possible selection bias increases the risks of importing, not necessarily
the best qualitative models, but those that are more familiar to the adjudicators.45
The migration of constitutional ideas can (and has been) criticized on
several grounds. First, by adopting “foreign elements,” adjudicators risk
38

See C. Picker, International Investment Law: Some Legal Cultural Insights, in REGIONALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 27, 27–58 (L. Trakman & N. Ranieri eds., 2013).
39
See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 767 (2012) (mentioning the views of a few scholars that “the United States is losing
constitutional influence” and that “the reluctance of the U.S. Supreme Court to pay decent respect to the
opinions of mankind by participating in an ongoing global judicial dialogue is supposedly diminishing
the global appeal and influence of American constitutional jurisprudence.”).
40
See infra Part I.C.
41
See Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative Law as
a Critique of Global Governance 11 (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. Comp. Research in Law & Pol. Econ.,
Research Paper No. 1/2012, 2012) (“Just as comparative law in general, constitutional comparisons, too,
are still plagued by a great degree of methodological uncertainty and theoretical indeterminacy.”).
42
Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 221, 224 (1999) (highlighting that “a collective crisis of methodological confidence is something of a defining genre of comparative legal scholarship, as each commentator outdoes the next with
dire critiques of the field and timid solutions for reconfiguration.”).
43
Annelise Riles, The Projects of Comparison, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 2 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001).
44
Günther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation State,
in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 328 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010).
45
Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J.
COMP. L. 125 (2005).
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making or transforming the law rather than interpreting or applying it. Customary norms of treaty interpretation, as restated by the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), demand that adjudicators rely on the text of
the applicable law. Second, sovereignty concerns—critics contend—also
matter as courts should not impose “foreign moods, fads, or fashions” on
their audiences, as this would infringe the separation of powers and undermine the very legitimacy of the adjudicators.46 Third, some scholars question whether constitutional ideas can migrate successfully from a given
constitutional experience to the international plane,47 contending that constitutional ideas cannot be separated from the constitutional culture in which
they are rooted.48
The question of whether some legal systems are comparable lies at the
very heart of any comparative endeavor. At the macro-level, the argument
goes that EU law and international investment law are comparable to public
law adjudication.49 Under EU law and investment law, states have agreed to
give the CJEU and arbitrators respectively a comprehensive jurisdiction
over what are essentially regulatory disputes.50 Authors postulate the existence of a regional and transnational “administrative space”: a space in
which the firm separation between national, regional “and international has
largely broken down, in which administrative functions are performed in
often complex interplays between . . . institutions on different levels . . . .”51
The CJEU has made consistent use of comparisons, referring to the
constitutional experiences of the Member States to elaborate general principles of EU law.52 In parallel, investor-state arbitration has been conceptualized as a global administrative law (GAL) creature,53 which impels states to
46

Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2495 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see generally Foster v.
Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 470–71 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
47
Zumbansen, supra note 41, at 16 (wondering whether constitutional ideas can be “conceived in
near to complete isolation of the historical-intellectual contexts in which the very concepts . . . ha[d]
their origin” and pinpointing the need to “understand the potential of bringing the hidden histories of a
particular legal field to light, as they feed into the conceptualization on a world scale.”).
48
Id. (suggesting that “close readings of national narratives of administrative governance reveal
particular connotations of regulatory power and of the relationship between different institutions (legislature, executive, judiciary and administrative agencies).”).
49
See generally MONTT, supra note 27; VAN HARTEN, supra note 27; DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PREMISE
(2008).
50
Valentina Vadi & Lukasz Gruszczynski, Standards of Review in International Investment Law
and Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and the Commonweal, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2013).
51
Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction, Global Governance and Global Administrative
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2006).
52
GIORGIO REPETTO, ARGOMENTI COMPARATIVI E DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI IN EUROPA: TEORIE
DELL’INTERPRETAZIONE E GIURISPRUDENZA SOVRANAZIONALE [COMPARATIVE ARGUMENTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION AND JURISPRUDENCE
SUPRANATIONAL] 192 (2011).
53
Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Ad-
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conform to global administrative law principles.54 Investment disputes arise
from the exercise of public authority by the state, and arbitral tribunals are
given the power to review and control such an exercise of public authority.55 Their awards ultimately shape the relationship between state, on the
one hand, and private individuals on the other.56 Arbitrators determine matters such as the legality of governmental activity, the degree to which individuals should be protected from regulation, and the appropriate role of the
state.57
Nevertheless, other analogies are proposed at the macro-level,58 and
international law scholars prefer to analogize EU adjudication and investment treaty arbitration to other forms of international dispute settlement.
Some view the European Union legal order as “essentially one of international law.”59 Arbitral tribunals review state action in the light of international investment treaty provisions.60 Both systems are “about the way in
which we bring the state under some measure of control, which is the main
aspiration of general international law.”61 At the end of the day, both EU
adjudication and investment arbitration are conducted on the basis of international treaties at a supranational level. Therefore, the CJEU and arbitral
tribunals are analogous to other international courts and tribunals.
Given the supranational law setting of EU adjudication and investment
treaty arbitration respectively, it would be inappropriate to automatically
transpose the experience of any national jurisdiction to such settings. For
instance, “the Court of Justice has deliberately refrained from citing the rulings of national courts in order to avoid allegations of cherry-picking or of
the privileging of the rulings of one or more Member State courts over others.”62 Analogously, in investment treaty arbitration, reference to the constiministrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 121 (2006) (suggesting that “international investment arbitration—pursuant to regional and bilateral investment treaties—offers the clearest example of global administrative law, strictly construed, yet to have emerged.”).
54
For a critical assessment of this theory, see Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest
for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006).
55
See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 53, at 121, 123.
56
VAN HARTEN, supra note 27, at 9.
57
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on Foreign Investment, 12 CAN. FOREIGN POL’Y J. 17 (2003).
58
Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 46 (2003).
59
Timothy Moorhead, European Union Law as International Law, 5 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 126,
126–43 (2012).
60
Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, 12
GERMAN L.J. 1083, 1088 (2011).
61
James Crawford, International Protection of Foreign Direct Investment: Between Clinical Isolation and Systematic Integration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL
LAW: FROM CLINICAL ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION? 22 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J.
Tams eds., 2011) (referring to investment arbitration only).
62
Gráinne De Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Hu-
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tutional experience of a country different from the host state might seem out
of place.63 Only insofar as a discrete number of constitutional experiences
constitute evidence of state practice or general principles of law can they
assume relevance in the context of supranational adjudication.
Against this background, this article suggests that studies from different domains of international, regional, and comparative law are needed for
mapping the migration of constitutional concepts from constitutional law to
regional and international economic law. This study focuses on a case,
which exemplifies how, at the micro-level, constitutional ideas have migrated to EU law and investment law, respectively. Proportionality analysis
is an interesting case study because its migration from constitutional law to
the supranational level is forcefully advocated by a number of scholars.64
Yet, the methodological challenges and opportunities posed by the migration of proportionality to the supranational sphere have been undertheorised. It is now time to address this problem.
II. PROPORTIONALITY: A COSMOPOLITAN DESTINY?
A paradigmatic example of the migration of constitutional ideas is given by the mobility of proportionality across a wide range of national, regional and international legal systems.65 As a legal concept, proportionality
expresses the idea that there should be a balance between competing objectives or values.66 In a number of constitutional traditions, the concept of
proportionality is understood as a methodological framework for balancing
conflicting values and aiming at delimiting the legitimate exercise of state
authority.67
Conceived as a tool for reviewing state conduct (and thus closely connected with the aim of ensuring good governance), the proportionality test
is usually articulated in three main phases—suitability, necessity and pro-

man Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 168, 178 (2013).
63
An important instance in which a given constitutional practice may be relevant is when the applicable law is national law. In fact, some arbitral tribunals have referred to proportionality because proportionality was embedded in the national law, which was applicable to the given dispute. See infra Part III.
64
See, e.g., B. Kingsbury & S. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State
Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest: The Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 75 (S. Schill ed., 2010).
65
MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 2
(2012) (noting that in the past decades proportionality has become “one of the most prominent instances
of the successful migration of constitutional ideas . . .”).
66
The idea of justice as an archetype of proportion also appeared in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. See Eric Engle, The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview, 10
DARTMOUTH L.J. 1, 3 (2012).
67
Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic
in Comparative (Constitutional) Law, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 555 (2008).
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portionality.68 The suitability test requires that the adopted measure be appropriate to achieve the stated aims. There must be a rational, logical and
causal relationship between the measure and its objectives. The necessity
test aims at verifying that the measure was the least restrictive available alternative or that no less drastic means were available. The proportionality
test in the narrow sense requires adjudicators to ascertain that the benefit
obtained from realizing the objective exceeds the harm caused by the
adopted measure.
The main reason for proportionality’s success in the marketplace of
ideas is its ability to restrain the exercise of public authority, shape judicial
review, and manage private actors’ expectations. This section dissects this
reason examining its various elements.
First, proportionality is based on “a culture of justification” which
“requires that governments should provide substantive justification for all
their actions . . . .”69 In order to be legitimate, a governmental action must
be “justified in terms of its ‘cogency’ and its capacity for ‘persuasion,’ that
is, in terms of its rationality and reasonableness,”70 as well as efficiency and
optimization concerns.71 Proportionality is a “deliberative methodology,”72
which requires that all of the relevant factors be considered and can insert
“Socratic contestation” in the deliberative process of governmental action.73
It then requires that a balance be struck according to the importance of the
relevant interests depending on the contextual circumstances.
Second, proportionality limits the subjectivity of the adjudicator, empowering courts and tribunals to review state conduct in a significant fashion, and providing a structured, formalized and seemingly objective test. All
awards and decisions must state the reasons on which they are based74; failure to state such reasons is a ground for annulment of the award.75 Proportionality also allows adjudicators to adopt nuanced decisions rather than
“all-or-nothing” approaches76 and to structure their analysis in a framework
which “may produce better and more convincing reasoning, and enable
68

Jan H. Jans, Proportionality Revisited, 27 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 239, 240–41
(2000).
69
Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 AM. J.
COMP. L. 463, 467 (2011).
70
Id. at 475.
71
Id. at 467.
72
Iddo Porat, Some Critical Thoughts on Proportionality, in REASONABLENESS AND LAW 243, 244
(Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara Valentini eds., 2009).
73
Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of
Rights Based Proportionality Review, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 141 (2010).
74
See generally Pierre Lalive, On the Reasoning of International Arbitral Awards, 1 J. INT’L
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 55, 55 (2010).
75
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 52(1).
76
Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 64, at 75, 79.
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clearer assessment of tribunals, thus enhancing predictability.”77 In addition,
proportionality can provide “a common language that transcends national
borders and that allows for dialogue and exchange of information” between
courts and tribunals.78 Proportionality analysis can constitute an entry for
non-economic interests as expressed in general principles of law into the
argumentative framework of adjudication and thereby help to overcome the
fragmentation of international law.79
Finally, proportionality can also delimit—and thus indirectly define—
the legitimate expectations of private actors vis-à-vis regulatory or other
types of governmental interference with their vested rights. Proportionality
analysis can “reduc[e] the sense of defeat for the losing party. As such, it is
consensus-oriented because it acknowledges explicitly that there are valid
constitutional arguments on both sides and that the arguments outweighed
by the opposing ones do not lose thereby their constitutional weight.”80
Given the pervasiveness of the concept of proportionality in a few
constitutional traditions81 and in various areas of international law, some
authors contend that proportionality is an emerging general principle of international law,82 or even an already established one.83 If one admits that
such proposition is true, then such a contention would constitute a formidable entry point for proportionality analysis in supranational adjudication, as
adjudicators could refer to proportionality in their awards as either part of
the applicable law, under Article 42 of the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID
Convention),84 or as a rule of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT).85 If proportionality is a general principle of law, it
can help the interpreter address the high level of indeterminacy of treaty
provisions. Others contend that also good faith interpretation, as restated by
Article 31(1) of the VCLT may require some balancing between the public
77

Id. at 103.
Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 72, at 472.
79
S. Schill, Cross-Regime Harmonization through Proportionality Analysis: The Case of International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity and Human Rights, 27 ICSID REV. 87 (2012).
80
Wojciech Sadurski, Reasonableness and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics, in
REASONABLENESS AND LAW 129, 145 (Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara Valentini eds.,
2009).
81
See generally Alec Stone Sweet & Joseph Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73 (2008).
82
ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 169 (2012).
83
See generally ENZO CANNIZZARO, IL PRINCIPIO DELLA PROPORZIONALITÁ NELL’ORDINAMENTO
INTERNAZIONALE [THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] (2000).
84
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).
85
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
78
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and the private interest.86
III. PROPORTIONALITY: THE PERILS OF SUCCESS
The migration of the concept of proportionality from constitutional
law to the supranational sphere poses a range of challenges. In particular, its
viability as the main tool for balancing different interests and values has
been challenged on five grounds: (1) institutional competences; (2) scale of
values; (3) cultural arguments; (4) incommensurability; and (5) overprotection of property rights.
First, proportionality can be perceived as running against the traditional allocation of institutional competences among the executive, the judiciary
and the administrative organs. Democratic arguments run against using balancing to review the host state’s decisions, because adjudicators would second-guess the decisions of the host state by repeating the original decision
making process.87 By considering different alternatives to given measures
under the necessity test, and by balancing competing interests under the
proportionality test the adjudicator interferes with the regulatory autonomy
of states, supplanting the role of legitimately deputed decision-makers.88
The rise of the proportionality analysis “as a juristic method, rather than a
method restricted to legislation, threatens the sharp distinction between legislation and legal interpretation . . . .”89 As Stone Sweet and Mathews put it,
“balancing can never be dissociated from lawmaking: it requires judges to
behave as legislators.”90 In particular, the necessity test would—almost
without exception—invalidate the given measure since the adjudicator can
always envisage alternatives ex post with the benefit of hindsight.
Second, proportionality does not clarify the scale of values to be used
in order to evaluate competing objectives. Even if the given measure passes
the suitability and necessity tests, it may be considered to be disproportionate under the third prong of the test when it is assessed in the light of competing norms and objectives. In this context, “[t]he central question [i]s
what must be proportionate to what.”91 Proportionality analysis tells us
nothing about the scale of values that will determine the final outcome. The
fact that proportionality concerns quantity rather than quality leaves the ad86

Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law 23 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law,
Pub. Law Research Paper, Working Paper No. 09-46, 2009).
87
Iddo Porat, Why All Attempts to Make Judicial Review Balancing Principled Fail?, Address before the VII World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law 7 (June 11, 2007).
88
KULICK, supra note 82, at 172.
89
David Kennedy, Political Ideology and Comparative Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 35, 36 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012).
90
Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 81, at 88.
91
Jans, supra note 68, at 239.
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judicator free to select his or her own value system, and the relevant criteria
to explain why one value is considered more important than another.92
Third, not only can proportionality analysis not take into account the
cultural context of a given measure, but it also risks importing its specific
cultural baggage into the adjudicative process. On the one hand, supranational adjudicators may not be familiar with the background of a given policy measure. As Burke White and von Staden point out, “prioritization of the
values chosen by the polity requires both familiarity with those values and a
degree of embeddedness within that polity.”93 However, supranational adjudicators are far removed from the polities over which they exercise control.
On the other hand, proportionality comes from a certain historical setting,94 reflecting distrust towards the public administration in the aftermath
of WWII.95 In a number of European countries, including Germany, constitutional law has gained an increasing primacy since the end of the war and
the democratic transitions that followed.96 Constitutional courts have played
a key role in making constitutional law effective,97 aiming to be an “impenetrable bulwark against any infringement of the rights of the people.”98 At
the same time, lawyers elaborated the respective constitutions on the basis
of “their understanding of state and society” with “distinct starting points
and trajectories.”99
Can proportionality be conceived in near to complete isolation from
the cultural context in which it originated? Critical legal theorists contend
that “hegemonic elites” might use proportionality to entrench their values
and shift power from the democratic process to the courts100 and that proportionality might have an “imperialistic effect,” in that it might set aside
local constitutional values.101 In the EU law context, the concept of proportionality has fostered the goal of European integration.102 With regard to in92

Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 81, at 89. See also Kennedy, supra note 93, at 38 (stressing
that there is a risk that proportionality analysis “operates in the shadow of ideology”).
93
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The
Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 336 (2010).
94
COHEN-ELIYA & PORAT, supra note 65, at 8.
95
M. Bobek, Reasonableness in Administrative Law: A Comparative Reflection on Functional
Equivalence, in REASONABLENESS AND LAW 311, 323 (Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara
Valentini eds., 2009).
96
M. Schor, Mapping Comparative Judicial Review, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 257, 271
(2008).
97
Mauro Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of “Constitutional
Justice”, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
98
Id. at 2 (quoting Piero Calamandrei).
99
Zumbansen, supra note 41, at 19.
100
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
101
COHEN-ELIYA & PORAT, supra note 65, at 8–9.
102
PAUL P. CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 532 (5th ed.
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vestment law, scholars question whether the application of proportionality
in investment arbitration could lead to the overprotection of property
rights.103
Fourth, some values can be incommensurable.104 While proportionality
assumes measurability—to be balanced, two competing principles should
be based on a common denominator105 —arguments are made that costbenefit analysis is flawed with respect to public sector decisions due to the
incommensurability of certain values.106
Fifth, the use of proportionality analysis can lead to the overprotection
of property rights if it is used in a very exacting fashion. In fact, the proportionality analysis can restrict the regulatory power of the state to a large extent if arbitral tribunals do not adopt deferential standards of review.
In conclusion, proportionality—like any conceptual framework—is
not a neutral process; rather it is based on the primacy and priority of individual entitlements over the exercise of public powers.107 The spread of the
proportionality analysis highlights “a shift from a culture of authority to a
culture of justification,” which is connected, inter alia, to the rise of the
human rights movement that developed after WWII. Whether this entails a
neglect of a polity’s choices towards a judicial dictatorship or the achievement of a higher rule of law—the ultimate rule of law108 —is open to debate.
IV. PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW
Proportionality is a general principle of European Union (EU) law and
can be used for reviewing EU action and Member State action that falls
within the sphere of EU law.109 The migration of the proportionality analysis from constitutional law to EU law is a paradigm of successful legal
transplant. Largely fashioned by the Union Courts, proportionality has subsequently assumed treaty status110 since the inception of the Maastricht
2011).

103

Han Xiuli, The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v. Mexico, 6 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 635, 635–52 (2007).
104
Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994).
105
AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 482–
84 (2012) (arguing that a common denominator exists in the form of the marginal social importance of
each value).
106
FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004).
107
Maria Sakellaridou, La Généalogie de la proportionalité [The Genealogy of Proportionality], Address before the VII World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law 20 (July 11,
2007).
108
See generally D.M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2003).
109
CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 102 at 526; see generally THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE, supra note 3; NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN
EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1996).
110
Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union art. 5, 2010, O.J. (C 83/01) (stating that
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Treaty.111 The criteria for its application are set out in the Protocol No. 2 on
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed
to the Treaties.112
The numerous reasons for the success of proportionality in EU law address the criticisms moved to proportionality in a seemingly effective fashion. Let us consider how the EU courts have transformed the various challenges posed by the proportionality concept in opportunities. First, with
regard to institutional competences, the courts have interpreted the concept
of proportionality in a flexible manner,113 conferring it a relative character
and showing varying degrees of deference. In some cases, the CJEU has
adopted “a very deferential approach,” in others it has conducted “quite a
rigorous and searching examination of the justification for a measure which
has been challenged.”114 In a seminal article, De Búrca noted:
[I]n reaching decisions, the Court of Justice is influenced not only by
what it considers to be the nature and the importance of the interest
or right claimed by the applicant, and the nature and importance of
the objective alleged to be served by the measure, but by the relative
expertise, position, and overall competence of the Court as against
the decision-making authority in assessing those factors.115

Some authors contend that the Court has adopted a stricter proportionality test when assessing national regulation (vertical dimension) and a
more lenient approach when assessing Union regulation (horizontal dimension).116 Therefore, according to these authors, the court will adopt more
demanding proportionality test in the former case, requiring the national
legislation to choose “the less restrictive alternative.”117 In such cases, the
Court tends to undertake a strict test of proportionality and only the less restrictive measures will be considered as proportionate.118 Instead, when re“the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Treaties.”).
111
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed on February 7, 1992 and entered into force on
November 1, 1993.
112
Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union Protocol (No 2), 2010, O.J. (C 83/01)
(on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon of December 13, 2007).
113
Tor Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, 16 EUR. L.J. 158
(2010).
114
Gráinne De Búrca, The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, in 13
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 105, 111–12 (Thomas Bingham et al. eds., 1993).
115
Id.
116
See generally TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 136–74, 193–241 (2d ed.
2006).
117
Harbo, supra note 113, at 172.
118
See, e.g., Case 104/75, Van Justitie v. de Peijper, 1976 E.C.R. 613 (deeming a national measure
conditioning the importation of medical products to the obtainment of certain documents to be dispro-
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viewing Union action, the court will deem the regulatory measure to be disproportionate only if it finds it manifestly inappropriate to achieve the stated objective.119
An alternative viewpoint suggests that the proportionality analysis has
been interpreted differently according to the various areas it is applied
to120—for instance showing a more deferential approach in the adjudication
of public health related disputes, while at the same time detecting discriminatory measures. This approach relies on the fact that the court has adopted
a strict proportionality test even for Community measures for instance
“where an individual argues that her rights have been unduly restricted by
Union action.”121 There are a number of examples where such measures
were deemed to be disproportionate.122
Regardless of what causes the varying intensity of the proportionality
test in EU adjudication, its is certainly not neutral. It is value-laden and expresses the Court’s function of adjudicating disputes and “promoting European integration.”123
Second, with regard to the scale of values, the case of the CJEU is rather unique, as the Court has recently acquired a mandate to adjudicate on
human rights violations, since the Lisbon Treaty124 conferred binding nature
to the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights.125 Not only has the European
Union integrated the consideration of human rights in its treaty texts, but it
is also negotiating its accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).126 Even before these notable institutional developments,
portionate as a means to protect public health); Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649 (deeming that the measure requiring a minimum alcohol content for a beverage was not necessary to protect consumers as less restrictive ways for protecting them
could be envisaged, such as labeling).
119
Id. For instance, in Hauer, the Court found that the Community regulatory measure was proportionate and thus not infringing the right to property. The claimant claimed that a Community regulation
prohibiting the planting of new vines on certain lands for three years violated her rights to property and
to pursue a trade. The claim was dismissed as the Court emphasized that the regulation pursued objectives of general interest and did not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the
property rights of the owner. The prohibition of the new planting of vines for a limited period of time
was justified by the objectives of general interest pursued by the Community, namely the reduction of
production surpluses and the restructuring of the European wine industry. Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land
Rheinland-Phalz, 1979 E.C.R 3727.
120
Harbo, supra note 113, at 172.
121
CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 106, at 529.
122
See, e.g., Case 114/76, Bela-Muhle v. Grows Farm, 1977 E.C.R. 1211 (holding that a regulation
requiring animal foodstuff producers to buy skimmed milk powder at a price three times more expensive
than its current value was disproportionate).
123
Id.
124
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
125
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364/1).
126
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
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“the Court has made reference, for several decades since the early 1970s, to
fundamental rights as general principles of law, and to provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights as a source of inspiration underpinning these general principles . . . .127 Therefore, favoring the objective of
European integration does not necessarily entail a predominance of economic interests vis-à-vis other non-economic values as the latter constitute
part of the European project. This is particularly evident in a number of
cases.128
Third, with regard to the cultural arguments, while the Court has derived the proportionality concept from “(some of) the Member States’ legal
orders,”129 its application of the concept has at times converged130 and at
times diverged from that of national courts.131 More interestingly, when reviewing state measures the CJEU has acknowledged the possibility of different approaches by Member States to similar issues,132 and has been “willing to interpret proportionality in the light of the Member State’s particular
values, notwithstanding that those values differ from those of other Member
States.”133 In a few cases, the invocation of a norm as reflecting constitutional history and identity has been accepted as a ground for relaxing the
proportionality test.134
Fourth with regard to incommensurability, the Court has found a
common denominator in the various interests at stake in their social function. Finally, with regard to the eventual overprotection of property rights,
relying on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the
ECJ has pointed out that rights are not absolute and there may be cases in

127

De Búrca, supra note 62, at 170.
Joined Cases C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n,
2008 E.C.R. I-6351 (annulling the regulation that froze the funds of Mr. Kadi and finding that such
measure infringed the right of effective judicial review, and the right to property. The regulation had
given effect to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted against the AlQaeda.); Case C-36/2002, Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609 (upholding a German ban on the commercialization of
violent games for protecting public policy and human dignity).
129
Harbo, supra note 113, at 172.
130
See, e.g., Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Phalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727 (holding that the relevant Community regulation was proportionate to the stated objective).
131
See, e.g., Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle für Getreide
und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (holding that the Community measure was proportionate to the stated objective).
132
Case C-108/96, Criminal Proceedings against Dennis Mac Quen et al., 2001 E.C.R. I-837, ¶ 34
(stating that “the mere fact that a Member State has chosen a system of protection different from that
adopted by another Member State cannot affect the appraisal of the need for and the proportionality of
the provisions adopted.”).
133
CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 102, at 532.
134
Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, 2010 E.C.R. I-13693, ¶¶ 83,
92.
128
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which private interests may be limited for the commonweal.135 While this
does not mean that all of the cases adjudicated by the CJEU have reached
an optimal balance between the competing interests,136 at least there is an
indication that this concern has been considered if not addressed by the
CJEU.
In conclusion, proportionality has migrated successfully from the national legal systems of the EU Member States to the EU legal system. On
the one hand, the EU courts have relied on the legal heritage of the Member
states to establish proportionality as a general principle of EU law. On the
other, they have interpreted the concept of proportionality in a flexible
manner—so flexible as to transcend the classical understanding of proportionality—shaping and adapting it to the various needs of European integration and the parallel protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Ultimately, the migration of proportionality from the national realm to
the regional level may constitute a case of “overfitting legal transplant,”—a
legal transplant which “work[s] even ‘better’ in the transplant than in the
origin country,”137 fitting particularly well in the peculiar structure of the
European Union. In fact, the accordion-like interpretation of proportionality
as broad or narrow in a particular case allows the courts of the Union to accommodate the converging divergences of the Member States, which promotes European integration while respecting state sovereignty.
V. PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION
Now the question is can proportionality be considered part of international investment law and arbitration? Some authors contend that arbitral
tribunals should adopt proportionality analysis,138 stating that “proportionality analysis offers the best available doctrinal framework with which to
meet the present challenges” to the investment treaty system.139 To the con135

See, e.g., C-331/88, R. v. Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex parte Fedesa, 1990
E.C.R. I-4023 (upholding a Community regulation prohibiting the use of hormones in meat production);
Case C-210/03, Swedish Match AB & Swedish Match UK Ltd. v. Sec’y of State for Health, 2004 E.C.R.
I-11893, ¶¶ 56–58 (upholding the ban on tobacco for oral use deeming it to be proportionate the stated
objective, namely the protection of public health, and acknowledging that other measures such as labeling could not achieve the same preventive effect).
136
See Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n & Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line
ABP & OÜ Viking Line Eesti, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779. For commentary, see A.C.L. Davies, One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ, 37 INDUS. L.J. 126 (2008).
137
Mathias M. Siems, The Curious Case of Overfitting Legal Transplants, in THE METHOD AND
CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARK VAN HOECKE 133–146, 134. (Maurice
Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., 2014).
138
See Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW AND
LEGAL ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 46 (2010).
139
Id. at 48.
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trary, a few investment law scholars have pointed out that “there does not
seem to be a strong legal basis for the application [of the proportionality
analysis] in the cases where it has been applied” and that the conceptual
foundations for using proportionality analysis in investment arbitration are
shaky.140
Most investment treaties do not refer to proportionality.141 As the European experience shows, however, this does not necessarily mean that proportionality is not part of the investment law system. In fact, this could be
the case if arbitral tribunals used such concept. Against the background of a
lively doctrinal debate on the migration of proportionality to investment
treaty arbitration, an examination of the arbitral practice is of critical relevance for ascertaining whether and, if so, how proportionality has migrated
to investment treaty arbitration.
While reference to proportionality used to be rare in investment arbitration, in the past decade arbitral tribunals have increasingly relied on some
form of proportionality analysis.142 This section explores how the concept
has been used to define substantive standards of protection, including the
protection against unlawful expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and
non-discrimination. It also discusses some cases which referred to proportionality as required under the applicable national law and other cases in
which proportionality was used to define the ambit of application of given
exceptions. Finally, the section concludes discussing how proportionality
has been used also with regard to procedural matters.
With regard to the notion of expropriation, in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States, which concerned the replacement of an unlimited license by a license of limited duration for the
operation of a landfill, the Arbitral Tribunal used the concept of proportionality to ascertain whether given measures could be characterized as expropriatory. The Tribunal considered whether such actions or measures were
“proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the
protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the proportionali-

140

BENEDIKT PIRKER, PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS AND MODELS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2013).
But see Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America,
U.S.-S.Kor., June 30, 2007, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (entered into force Mar. 15,
2012); 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009, ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST
ASIAN NATIONS (entered into force Mar. 29, 2012).
142
This section does not purport to be exhaustive, as some arbitral tribunals may not be disclosed to
the public, and other awards may have referred to proportionality only implicitly. This section acknowledges only awards which have used the concept of proportionality expressis verbis. The argument is that
the use of some elements of proportionality, like suitability, is a common judicial endeavor and therefore
should not be reconnected to proportionality as such; while the implicit use of all of the various elements
of proportionality without naming it would give rise to a number of distinct hermeneutical and legitimacy concerns.
141
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ty.”143
In Azurix, which involved a water concession contract, Argentina had
enacted measures for the protection of public health after an algae outbreak
contaminated water supply after privatization.144 Warnings not to drink water were enacted and customers were dissuaded from paying their water
bills.145 In order to ascertain whether there was a (compensable) expropriation or a (non-compensable) legitimate exercise of police powers, the Tribunal relied on Tecmed, and its analysis of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR)’s jurisprudence, stating that an expropriatory measure must
pursue a “legitimate aim in the public interest” and the means employed
must be (reasonably) proportional to the stated objective.146 The Tribunal
dismissed the claim of expropriation.
In Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, Ecuador contended that “[its]
intervention in Blocks 7 and 21 did not constitute an expropriation of Burlington’s investment”; rather, it “aimed at preventing significant harm to the
Blocks’ and in Ecuador’s view it ‘was necessary, adequate, proportionate
under the circumstances.’”147 The Arbitral Tribunal confirmed that Ecuador’s intervention in the Blocks “was necessary to avoid significant economic loss and the risk of permanent damage to the Blocks. It was also appropriate because Ecuador entered the Blocks without using force. It was
equally proportionate as the means employed were suited to the ends of
protecting the Blocks.”148
With regard to the fair and equitable treatment standard, in MTD Equity SDN BHD and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, which concerned
the failure of a construction project deemed to be inconsistent with zoning
regulations, the Arbitral Tribunal held that fair and equitable treatment is “a
broad and widely-accepted standard encompassing such fundamental standards as good faith, due process, nondiscrimination and proportionality.”149
In Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and
Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, the Arbitral Tribunal stated
that “numerous investment treaty tribunals have found that the principle of
proportionality is part and parcel of the overarching duty to accord fair and
equitable treatment to investors.”150 The claimant contended that a given
143

Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003).
144
Azurix v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (June 23, 2006).
145
Id. ¶ 283.
146
Id. ¶ 311.
147
Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, ¶ 164
Dec. 14, 2012).
148
Id. ¶ 504.
149
MTD Equity SDN BHD & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7,
Award, ¶ 109 (May 25, 2004).
150
Occidental Petroleum Corp. & Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador,
ICSID Case ARB/06/11, 70 n.7 (Dec. 16, 2011).
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sanction imposed by Ecuador was disproportionate and therefore violated
legitimate expectations under the relevant BIT.151 The Tribunal concluded
that the measure “was not a proportionate response by Ecuador in the particular circumstances of this case.”152
Yet, in Glamis Gold v. United States of America, concerning a gold
mining project in California, the claimant’s attempt to impose upon respondent the burden of justifying the appropriateness of the regulatory
measures and proving that they are “the least restrictive measures available”
and “necessary, suitable and proportionate” failed.153 The Tribunal noted
that “it is not for an international tribunal to delve into the details of and
justifications of domestic law.”154 It also stated that “[i]t is not the role of
this Tribunal, or any international tribunal, to supplant its own judgment of
underlying factual material and support for that of a qualified domestic
agency.155 To deem it otherwise—in the words of the claimant—would
amount to transform arbitrators into ‘archeologists and ethnographers.’”156
With regard to non-discrimination, in Parkerings v. Lithuania, which
concerned the planned construction of a parking area, the Tribunal stated
that “to violate international law, discrimination must be unreasonable or
lacking proportionality, for instance, it must be inapposite or excessive to
achieve an otherwise legitimate objective of the State.”157 Yet, in Pope &
Talbot, the Tribunal dismissed Canada’s argument that the foreign investor
should prove that it was “disproportionately disadvantaged” by the measure.158 The Tribunal considered that the disproportionate advantage test
would weaken NAFTA’s ability to protect foreign investors.159
Other cases referred to proportionality as if it were a requirement under the applicable national law. In Aucoven v. Venezuela, relating to a
highway concession, Venezuela argued that Aucoven’s claims did not meet
the criteria of definiteness and proportionality required by Venezuelan
law.160 In Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, the Tribunal considered that
“[the] Respondent’s conduct did not infringe the principles of legal certainty and proportionality in violation of the full protection and safety clause

151

Id. ¶ 277.
Id. ¶ 338.
153
Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., IIC 380, Award, ¶ 590 (June 8, 2009).
154
Id. ¶ 762.
155
Id. ¶ 779.
156
Id. (stating that the Tribunal was mindful of Respondent’s statement that “[i]t is simply not this
Tribunal’s task to become archaeologists and ethnographers . . .”).
157
Parkerings v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 368 (Sept. 11, 2007).
158
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal, Award on Merits of Phase 2, ¶¶
43–45 (Apr. 10, 2001).
159
Id. ¶ 79.
160
Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. (‘Aucoven’) v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Award, ¶ 338 (Sept. 23, 2003).
152
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contained in Article 2(2) of the BIT.”161 The claimant argued:
Instead of freezing only the cash equivalent to the claimed tax
amount, Romania chose, through its fiscal authorities, to sequester
all [Claimant’s] assets . . . and bank accounts . . . [t]his decision impaired Claimant’s right to dispose of its investment and was taken in
breach of the principles of due process, proportionality and reasonableness.162

However, the Tribunal held that “[claimant] has not proved that this
sequestration was discriminatory, disproportionate or otherwise improper
under Romanian law.”163 In Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, the
claimant contended that “both international and Ecuadorian law proscribe
the unilateral termination of a government contract where . . . the alleged
breach was always known and never objected to by the State, and such termination was manifestly unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportionate.”164 The claimant alleged that a given decree was “in breach of the Respondent’s obligations under the Treaty and Ecuadorian law because it was
unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportionate.”165 The Tribunal noted that the proportionality review of the decree “pervaded the submissions
of both parties” as “the Ecuadorian Constitution firmly establishes as a matter of Ecuadorian law the principle of proportionality.”166
In other cases, proportionality was used to define the ambit of application of given exceptions. For instance, in Continental Casualty v. Argentine
Republic, concerning an insurance business, the Tribunal imported the
“weighting and balancing” formula from international trade law.167 Both
parties had referred to the concept of proportionality. The claimant pointed
out to Argentina’s Supreme Court decisions that declared a given decree “to
be unconstitutional on the grounds that it was an unreasonable measure,
lacking in proportionality between the deprivation of property rights and the
objective of averting the crisis . . . .”168 The Tribunal considered the following:
[T]he Government’s efforts struck an appropriate balance between
that aim and the responsibility of any government towards the coun161

Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 358 (Dec. 7, 2011).
Id. ¶ 394.
163
Id. ¶ 515.
164
Occidental Petroleum Corp. & Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, ¶ 203 (Dec. 16, 2011).
165
Id. ¶ 206.
166
Id. at 70 n.7, ¶¶ 396–401 (on the principle of proportionality in Ecuadorian law).
167
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 192 (Sept. 5, 2008).
168
Id. ¶ 67.
162
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try’s population: it is self-evident that not every sacrifice can properly be imposed on a country’s people in order to safeguard a certain
policy that would ensure full respect towards international obligations in the financial sphere, before a breach of those obligations can
be considered justified as being necessary under this BIT. The standard of reasonableness and proportionality do not require as much.169

Finally, proportionality has also been used with regard to matters of
procedure. In Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, which
concerned the seizure of two electric utility companies, the Tribunal stated:
[T]here needs to be some proportionality in the award (as opposed to
the expenditure) of legal costs and expenses.170 A party with a deep
pocket may have its own justification for heavy spending, but it cannot expect to be reimbursed for all its expenditure as a matter of
course simply because it is ultimately the prevailing party.171

In Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic
of Kazakhstan, which concerned license to explore and extract hydrocarbons, the Tribunal acknowledged:
[O]n [the] one hand, ordering the production of documents can be
helpful for a party to present its case and in the Tribunal’s task of establishing the facts of the case relevant for the issues to be decided,
but, on the other hand, (1) the process of discovery and disclosure
may be time consuming, excessively burdensome and even oppressive and that unless carefully limited, the burden may be disproportionate to the value of the result, and (2) Parties may have a legitimate interest of confidentiality.172

These arbitrations took place in a variety of different locations, were
conducted by different arbitral tribunals under different bilateral treaties,
and concerned different subject matters and causes of action. One may legitimately wonder whether there is any commonality between these awards.
One may also question the relevance of discussing previous awards, given
the fact that there is no binding precedent in international (investment) law.
These awards show an increasingly frequent pattern in the use of some
form of proportionality analysis in investment treaty arbitration. Proportionality analysis is used in a varying of contexts—delimiting substantive
standards of protecting, clarifying procedural matters and even quantifying
169

Id. ¶ 227.
Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Award, ¶
565(c) (Sept. 2, 2011).
171
Id.
172
Liman Caspian Oil BV & NCL Dutch Inv. BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/14, Award, ¶ 26 (June 22, 2010).
170

582

2VADI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/6/15 1:04 AM

The Migration of Constitutional Ideas
35:557 (2015)

damages and legal fees. The study of previous awards is useful because patterns of consistent use can and do influence subsequent awards.
Yet, the proportionality analysis is not used consistently in investment
treaty arbitration. As mentioned, arbitral tribunals have used the proportionality concept in different contexts. Proportionality is often mentioned in
passing together with other concepts such as reasonableness and rationality.
Most tribunals have not used it at all. More importantly, no single unified
notion of proportionality has been used. Instead, arbitral tribunals seem to
have elaborated ad hoc notions of proportionality depending on circumstances. In the context of investment arbitration, the proportionality analysis
lacks the clearly articulated structure it has in other fields of national, regional, and international law.173
In conclusion, while generic reference to proportionality has increased
in the awards rendered in the past decade, a critical mass of awards relying
on this test is missing. In addition, at an analytical level, one may ask
whether proportionality is inevitable; whether it is needed in investment arbitration; or whether it can contribute to better awards given the specific
features of international investment law.
V. A HISTORY OF SUCCESS?
While the migration of constitutional ideas can flourish in certain contexts, it may easily falter in others. Why have EU adjudicators been drawn
to proportionality when treaty tribunals have been half-hearted or even hostile to the concept? The answer is multifold.
First, EU law and investment law present very different institutional
settings. EU law builds upon and fosters legal cohesiveness in the Union,
constituting a sui generis system lying between a fully-fledged constitutional order and an international organization.174 Joseph Weiler argued, “one of
the great perceived truisms, or myths, of the European Union legal order is
its alleged rupture with, or mutation from, public international law and its
transformation into a constitutional legal order.”175 Certainly, the Union is
not a federal system, and the failure to ratify an explicit EU Constitution in
2005 signals some reticence in that regard at least in some Member
States.176 Yet, EU law has a “constitutional dimension.”177 Over time, the
173

N. Di Mascio & J. Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart
or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 76 (2008) (noting that “The majority of the
tribunals have . . . taken a considerably softer approach than the ‘necessity test’ under many GATT Article XX exceptions, looking only for a ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational’ nexus between the measure and the policy pursued.”).
174
See generally M. Poiares Maduro, How Constitutional Can the EU Be? The Tension Between
Intergovernamentalism and Constitutionalism in the EU (Jean Monnet, Working Paper No. 5/04, 2004).
175
JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 295 (1999).
176
See generally Giuseppe Martinico, From the Constitution for Europe to the Reform Treaty: A
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EU treaties have been perceived as having assumed some constitutional features.178 Although the Treaty of Rome was concluded in the form of an international treaty, it has become the constitutional charter of the Union.179
In fact, the European Court of Justice played a pivotal role in creating a material constitution in its judgments,180 holding that the treaties founding the
European communities (now the European Union) established a new legal
order whose subjects do not only comprise Member States, but also their
nationals.181 Commentators have pointed out that the court “constru[ed] the
European Communities Treaties in a constitutional mode rather than employing the traditional international law methodology.”182 More fundamentally, the integration project reflects some evidence of commonality in constitutional principles or constitutional dialogue in Europe.183
By contrast, international investment law is a relatively fragmented
system where different arbitral tribunals interpret different treaties. Because
of the lack of “stare decisis” in investment arbitration, it may be difficult to
elaborate a meaningfully consistent proportionality test. Furthermore, EU
law and investment law are at a different stage of development,184 and this
makes their comparison necessarily approximate and perhaps premature.
Second, despite some commonalities, EU law and international investment law have very different aims and objectives. Both systems presuppose a triangular relationship between: (1) the individual—the EU citizen and the investor respectively; (2) the state—the Member state or host
state respectively—imposing certain burdens on that individual which may
Literature Survey on European Constitutional Law, PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM, May 12, 2009.
177
Wolf Sauter, Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act? 4–5 (Tilburg L. & Econ. Ctr., ILEC,
Discussion Paper No. 2013-003, 2013) (referring to the existence of an “implicit constitution”).
178
See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council &
Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351 (holding that “obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot
have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty”).
179
Case 249/83, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339 (stating that
“[T]he European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither
its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted
by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty.”).
180
See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R.
585; Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629.
181
Opinion 1/91 of the Court Pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty on the Draft Treaty on the
Establishment of the European Union Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. I-6079.
182
Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L.
1, 27 (1981).
183
Monica Claes & Maartje De Visser, Reflections on Comparative Method in European Constitutional Law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 143, 168–169 (Maurice Adams & Jacco
Bomhoff eds., 2012) (noting that “by carrying out comparative constitutional research . . . there will be
evidence of commonality in constitutional principles,” and suggesting that comparative law can contribute to “constitutional dialogue in Europe”).
184
While there are thousands of publicly available cases adjudicated by the CJEU, the available investment awards are much more limited.
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preclude the exercise of her rights—under EU or investment law respectively; and (3) the supranational court—the CJEU or the relevant arbitral tribunal respectively.185 Despite this common tripartite framework, there are
very different fundamental assumptions underlying the two systems. On the
one hand, the once European Economic Community (EEC) “‘market citizen’—Marktbürger—engaged in using the market freedoms under the EEC
Treaty”186 has become a European Union citizen entitled to a number of
rights, not only of an economic nature. Therefore, the balancing process
takes place in a system where economic interests are part of a broader picture. By contrast, international investment law has the objective of fostering
foreign direct investment and of promoting economic development.187 Arbitral tribunals do not have the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CJEU; rather they have a more limited mandate.
Third, the CJEU has abstracted the proportionality principles from the
legal systems of its Member States; unless the proportionality principles
was also a principle of international law, or was part of the applicable law
as included in the domestic law of the host state it appears that its application might seem shaky. In this regard it is remarkable that arbitral tribunals
have used proportionality in conjunction with other criteria such as reasonableness and rationality.
On the other hand, further reflection on methodological issues is of
key importance. Methodological concerns have long been a common feature of comparative constitutional law.188 Although there is no single methodological model in comparative law, two fundamental approaches to the
field have emerged—the functional approach and the cultural approach.189
The functional approach relies on the assumption that law addresses social
problems and that all societies confront essentially the same challenges.190
The functional approach thus presupposes similarity among legal systems
185

For analogous reasoning with regard to EU law, see Norbert Reich, How Proportionate is the
Proportionality Principle? Some Critical Remarks on the Use and Methodology of the Proportionality
Principle in the Internal Market Case Law of the ECJ, Working Paper presented at the Oslo conference
on The Reach of Free Movement (May 18, 2011).
186
Id. at 11.
187
See, e.g., J. Bhagwati, Why Multinationals Help Reduce Poverty, 30 WORLD ECON. 211 (2007);
V.N. Balasubramanyam, M. Salisu & D. Sapsford, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: New Hypotheses and Evidence, 8 J. INT’L TRADE & ECON. DEV. 27 (1999).
188
See Günther Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology—Toward a
Layered Narrative, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 439 (2006); Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections on Method in
Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 67 (Sujit Choudry ed.,
2006); Peer Zumbansen, Comparative Law’s Coming of Age?, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1073 (2005).
189
See generally Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339–382 (Matthias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006)
(explaining the functional approach); Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232
(1996) (explaining the cultural approach).
190
See, e.g., Konrad Zweigert, Méthodologie du droit compare [Methodology of Comparative Law],
in MÉLANGES J. MAURY 579, 570–596 (Dalloz-Sirey ed., 1960).
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(praesumptio similitudinis),191 potentially reflecting “epistemological optimism,”or the belief that legal systems are comparable.192 For instance, Alan
Watson contended that there is no inherent relationship between law and
society—being autonomous from any social structure, law develops by
transplanting.193 Inevitably, the concept will adapt to the new context; however, according to Watson, the adaptation does not imply the failure of the
transplant; rather it is a natural process.194
Cultural approaches reject a purely functionalist vision of law and
contend that law expresses and develops the cultural features of a society.
Therefore, not only do comparativists need to consider the functions of legal concepts, but they also have to contextualise such concepts in their legal
matrix and culture of origin.195 Meaningful comparisons require understanding the cultural context of legal rules.196 For instance, Otto Kahn-Freund believed that law cannot be separated from its thelos and context.197 According to Kahn-Freund, not only should one verify whether the item that would
be borrowed has proven satisfactory in its system of origin, but she also
should consider whether it would be suitable to the potentially recipient system.198 As Pierre Legrand has stated, each legal system is unique, reflecting
a particular worldview.199 Law can be considered as a “cultural expression.”200
Despite their differences, comparative law methodologies share a
number of caveats as a common denominator. For instance, superficial borrowing, based on inadequately verified information should be avoided (e.g.,
when adjudicators rely on sources provided by the parties without further
research). Analogously, the selection of the use of certain countries as examples should be justified. If comparisons are made, these should be explicit rather than implicit. The understanding of the borrowed items should be
proper, accurate and contextual. More fundamentally, one should consider
whether the migration of constitutional ideas to transnational systems serves
outcomes in compliance with the culture of such systems.
Finally, judicial borrowing cannot be a mechanical process also in
191

Jaakko Husa, Methodology of Comparative Law Today, 4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C.] 1095, 1107 (2006).
192
Mark Van Hoecke, Deep Level Comparative Law, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 172, 172–174 (2004).
193
See Watson, supra note 15, at 314–315; see generally WATSON, supra note 18.
194
WATSON, supra note 18.
195
John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 626 (1998).
196
Legrand, supra note 189.
197
Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974).
198
Id. at 6 (questioning: “Are there any principles which may assist us in measuring the degree to
which a foreign institution can be ‘naturalized’?”).
199
See Pierre Legrand, On the Singularity of Law, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 517 (2006).
200
See generally Reza Banakar, Power, Culture and Method in Comparative Law, 5 INT’L J. L.
CONTEXT 69, 78 (2009) (stressing the dialectical nature of the relationship between law and society).
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consideration of the fact that until recently both comparative law and international law used to have a Westphalian201—if not Eurocentric—
character.202 For a long time, comparative law (has) focused on European
legal systems; the law of former colonies—with the exception of US law—
was largely overlooked. In other words, by limiting its focus to Western legal traditions, comparative law contributed to the legitimization of an order
in which peripheral countries were rarely recognized for any creative contribution to the market of legal ideas.203 Comparative law scholars have assumed that law is almost completely of European-making, which unfolded
through nearly the entire world via colonialism, imperialism, trade, and
more recently, through neo-liberal structural adjustment programs in developing countries, post-conflict reconstruction, and reform in countries in
transition.
In parallel, the making of international law used to have a predominantly Western character.204 Some authors have even questioned whether
and how international is international law,205 highlighting “the idea of international law as an ordering mechanism that draws its categories from an essential culture and yet stands apart from its cultural context.”206 The origins
of international law are imbued of civil law ideas; the fathers of international law—such as Grotius, Gentili, and others—borrowed concepts from their
traditions that regarded Roman law as the standard by which justice should
be measured.207 Furthermore, international law mainly governed relations
among states, despite some treaties, which also regulated the interaction between states and indigenous peoples.208
In the post-colonial era, however, there is an emergent awareness that
201

See generally Treaty of Westphalia: Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and the King
of France and their respective Allies (1648), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_
century/westphal.asp.
202
See generally William Twining, Globalization and Comparative Law, 6 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &
COMP. L. 217, 233 (1999).
203
Jorge González Jácome, El uso del derecho comparado como forma de escape de la subordinación colonial [The Use of Comparative Law as a Way to Escape from Colonial Subordination], 7
INT’L L.: REV. COLOMB. DERECHO INT’L 295, 301 (2006): (affirming that “se está contribuyendo a la
legitimación de un orden geopolítico en donde a los países periféricos se les atribuye poca posibilidad
creativa en el mercado de las ideas jurídicas [it is contributing to the legitimacy of a geopolitical order in
which the peripheral countries are credited with little creative potential in the market for legal ideas].”).
204
See generally ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
205
Kurt T. Gaubatz & Matthew MacArthur, How International is International Law?, 22 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 239 (2001).
206
Annelise Riles, Note, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentialization of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723, 738 (1993).
207
See generally THE ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (Benedict Kingsbury & Benjamin Straumann eds., 2010).
208
A notable example is the Treaty of Waitangi, signed on February 6, 1840, by representatives of
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diffusion of law does not necessarily lead to convergence, harmonization,
or unification of laws. On the one hand, scholars have pointed out the multicultural genealogy of the Western legal tradition.209 On the other hand, the
imported law did not remain the same: “legal transplants undergo meaning
transformation once they are implanted into a new legal system” and are
“transformed by the new context.”210 Furthermore, in a number of countries—the so-called mixed jurisdictions—the Romano-Germanic tradition
and the common law have met and mingled for historical reasons with variegated outcomes.211 More recently, economic globalization has spurred the
constant contact and communication among legal cultures facilitating processes of mutual borrowing, cross-fertilization, and learning.212 Therefore
many characteristics that define and shape legal families “are fading or
spreading into other systems.”213
In conclusion, the migration of proportionality from constitutional law
to EU law has been a relatively straightforward process due to the fact that
such principles already belonged to the legal heritage of a few Member
States. The legal transplant was subject to some adaptation. In fact, the European courts have fashioned the proportionality to meet their own needs.
Authors have noted these unintended consequences of the “naturalization”
process—some have criticized the more lenient understanding of proportionality, highlighting that the CJEU interprets proportionality in some areas in a way that is closer to the reasonableness test than the classical understanding of the proportionality analysis.214 Others have suggested that
proportionality—like other general principles of law—may have become an
enfant terrible of the Court due to its unpredictability.215 On the other hand,
the migration has been successful exactly because the European Courts
have adapted the concept to the needs of European integration and the protection of human rights. More fundamentally, they have relied on the common European legal heritage. One may wonder whether the same preconditions for success also exist in investment arbitration. Arbitrators
should be aware of the methodological risks and opportunities offered by
209
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(2008); but see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 63 (2001) (stressing
the enduring difference between civil law and common law systems).
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comparative law: more fundamentally, they should be aware of their mandate to adjudicate the relevant disputes “in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law.”216
CONCLUSIONS
The migration of legal concepts has become an increasingly common
phenomenon, highlighting a cosmopolitan if not “nomadic” character of
law.217 Conceived as an analytical tool to assist adjudicators in determining
the interaction between public and private interests, the concept of proportionality has attracted increasing attention by scholars and policymakers and
has migrated from constitutional law to a number of other fields of national,
regional and international law. Proportionality can be used to delimit the
exercise of the police powers of the public authorities, ascertaining the consistency between a certain measure and its objectives.
This study investigated the question as to whether and if so, to what
extent, proportionality has migrated from constitutional law to EU law and
international investment law respectively. Undoubtedly, the migration of
proportionality to EU law is a paradigmatic case of successful legal transplant. The migration of proportionality to international investment law and
arbitration remains a work in progress. Eminent authors forcefully suggest a
broader use of proportionality in international investment law and arbitration. Others consider proportionality analysis inappropriate for arbitral tribunals. Rather they consider that a degree of deference should be paid to the
sovereign choices of the host state. Against this background, this article has
examined the relevant jurisprudence and proposed an alternative viewpoint,
namely that of the interplay between comparative law and international
law—highlighting the pros and cons, and the methodological issues raised
by the migration of constitutional ideas in general (and proportionality in
particular) from one field to another. If arbitral tribunals are to use proportionality to form their interpretation of particular provisions, they must ensure that they master the relevant methodological risks and opportunities.
This article is intended as a contribution to the debate in the field of
international and regional economic integration—identifying and critically
assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the migration of proportionality from constitutional law to supranational law. The adoption of proportionality is not a neutral process as it may have important consequences.
Certainly, more comparative constitutional law studies are needed to address the question as to whether proportionality is a general principle of international law.
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